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Notes
MICHIGAN v. BRYANT: RETURNING TO AN OPEN-ENDED
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE ANALYSIS
SHARI H. SILVER

*

In Michigan v. Bryant, 1 the United States Supreme Court considered whether a victim’s statements to police—made shortly after the
officers found the victim with a mortal gunshot wound—were admissible under the Confrontation Clause 2 of the Sixth Amendment. 3 The
Court held that the primary purpose of the police interrogation of
the victim was to respond to an ongoing emergency in which an
armed shooter was at large. 4 Based on this determination, the Court
concluded that the victim’s statements to the police were nontestimonial 5 and, therefore, did not implicate the Confrontation Clause. 6
The Court’s combined focus on the intent of the declarant and
the motives of the police to categorize the victim’s statements as nontestimonial was a predictable result of the incomplete and contradictory directives provided by Crawford v. Washington 7 and Davis v. Washington. 8 Despite an earlier rejection of open-ended Confrontation
Clause analysis, the Court’s combined focus on the declarant and the
Copyright © 2012 by Shari H. Silver.
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law; B.A.
2010, Vassar College. The author expresses special gratitude to Judge Paul W. Grimm and
Molly K. Madden, Notes and Comments Editor, for their invaluable advice throughout the
development of this Note. She would also like to thank Abigail Baird, an unsurpassed
teacher and friend, for her guidance and encouragement. Finally, the author is thankful
for her parents, Penny and Jeffrey Silver, who are unfailingly supportive and whose hard
work and dedication are a model for all that she does.
1. 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Confrontation Clause guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.” Id.
3. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150.
4. Id. at 1166–67.
5. See infra Part II.A.2–3.
6. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1167.
7. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
8. 547 U.S. 813 (2006); see infra Part IV.A.
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police promotes a discretionary standard that enables virtually any result on a given set of facts and fails to adequately safeguard defendants’ rights to confrontation. 9 Rather than develop a combined focus on the declarant and the officers, the Court should have created a
declarant-focused approach that limits discretionary analysis and protects defendants’ rights to confront the witnesses against them. 10
I. THE CASE
On April 29, 2001, Michigan police responded to a radio dispatch stating that a man had been shot. 11 Shortly thereafter the police found the victim, Anthony Covington, lying in the parking lot of a
gas station and suffering from a fatal gunshot wound to his abdomen. 12 The officers asked Covington “what had happened, who had
shot him, and where the shooting had occurred.” 13 Covington named
“Rick” as the shooter, provided a physical description of him, and
identified the rear of Rick’s house as the location of the shooting. 14
Covington further explained that he had been shot through the
closed back door and that he had escaped by driving himself six
blocks to the gas station. 15 Covington died within hours after he was
transported to the hospital. 16
The officers proceeded to Richard “Rick” Bryant’s house. 17 The
police found Covington’s wallet and identification outside of Bryant’s
house as well as blood on the back porch. 18 In addition, the police
discovered a bullet on the rear porch and a bullet hole in the back
9. See infra Part IV.B.
10. See infra Part IV.C. This Note will refer to the examination of an interrogation’s
primary purpose from the perspective of the declarant as the “declarant-focused approach.”
11. People v. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d 65, 67 (Mich. 2009), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
12. Id. The 2009 decision did not use the victim’s name, but an earlier decision did.
See People v. Bryant, No. 247039, 2004 WL 1882661, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2004)
(per curiam), rev’d, 768 N.W.2d 65 (Mich. 2009), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
13. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d at 71.
14. Id. at 67 & n.1. Covington’s brother testified that Rick sold drugs from the back
door of Rick’s house. Id. at 67. The brother also testified that the day before the shooting
Covington had told him that he planned to redeem from Rick a coat pawned earlier in
exchange for drugs. Id.
15. Id. Covington asserted that he knew Rick was his attacker even though he did not
see Rick shoot him. Id. Covington explained that he, prior to the shooting, had a short
conversation with Rick through the door and that he recognized Rick by the sound of his
voice. Id.
16. Id. Covington, prior to being taken to the hospital, repeatedly asked the police
when emergency medical services would arrive on scene. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1165.
17. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d at 67.
18. Id.
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door. 19 Bryant was not at home when the police arrived and was not
arrested until one year later. 20
At Bryant’s trial, the Wayne County Circuit Court admitted, as
excited utterances, 21 the statements Covington made to the police. 22
The jury was unable to reach a decision. 23 In Bryant’s second trial,
the jury convicted him of second-degree murder, possession of a firearm by a felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of
a felony. 24
Bryant appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals, arguing that
the admission of Covington’s statements violated his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. 25 The court of appeals affirmed
Bryant’s convictions on the grounds that Covington’s statements were
nontestimonial and therefore beyond the scope of the Confrontation
Clause. 26 Bryant appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court. 27 As
Bryant’s appeal before the Michigan Supreme Court was pending, 28
the United States Supreme Court decided Davis v. Washington, which
provided further guidance on determining statement admissibility
under the Confrontation Clause. 29 The Michigan Supreme Court
remanded Bryant’s case, ordering the court of appeals to reconsider
Bryant’s claim in light of Davis. 30
The court of appeals decided that the primary purpose of the police interrogation of Covington was to respond to an ongoing emergency. 31 Based on this determination, the court affirmed Bryant’s
convictions and concluded that Covington’s statements to the police
were admissible because they were nontestimonial. 32

19. Id.
20. Id. Bryant was arrested in California and then extradited to Michigan. Id.
21. For an explanation of the excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay
evidence, see infra note 56.
22. People v. Bryant, No. 247039, 2004 WL 1882661, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 24,
2004) (per curiam), rev’d, 768 N.W.2d 65 (Mich. 2009), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
23. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d at 67.
24. Bryant, 2004 WL 1882661, at *1.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. People v. Bryant, 722 N.W.2d 797, 797 (Mich. 2006), remanded to No. 02-005508,
2007 WL 675471 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2007) (per curiam), rev’d, 768 N.W.2d 65 (Mich.
2009), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
28. Id.
29. 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
30. Bryant, 722 N.W.2d at 797.
31. Bryant, 2007 WL 675471, at *3.
32. Id.
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Bryant appealed once more to the Michigan Supreme Court, and
the court reversed and remanded for a new trial. 33 The Michigan Supreme Court determined that the primary purpose of the police interrogation was to obtain information relevant for a later criminal
prosecution. 34 Accordingly, the court concluded that the victim’s
statements to the police were testimonial and that admitting the
statements violated Bryant’s right to confrontation. 35 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether Covington’s statements were admissible under the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment. 36
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In recent years, Confrontation Clause jurisprudence has undergone a transformation in which the United States Supreme Court
sought to reduce open-ended analysis and guarantee defendants’
rights to confront the witnesses against them. 37 Part II.A of this Note
discusses how the jurisprudence evolved from a reliance on discretionary evaluations of a statement’s reliability to the employment of a categorical approach in deciding whether a statement is admissible at
trial. Part II.B explains how, despite the Court’s attempts to streamline Confrontation Clause analysis, state and lower federal courts continue to exercise considerable discretion and reach unpredictable decisions regarding the confrontation right.
A. The United States Supreme Court Attempted to Abandon Its
Discretionary Approach to Confrontation Clause Analysis by Creating
a Categorical Standard
The Court has long emphasized the importance of the rights afforded by the Confrontation Clause, while still recognizing that certain situations justify dispensing with these rights. 38 Initially, the
Court employed hearsay rules and broad determinations of reliability
to decide admissibility of statements made by witnesses who were un-

33. People v. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d 65, 67 (Mich. 2009), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
34. Id. at 73.
35. Id. at 79. This conclusion was reached over two dissenting opinions that determined the primary purpose of the police interrogation of Covington was to meet an ongoing emergency. See id. (Weaver, J., dissenting); see also id. (Corrigan, J., dissenting).
36. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1152.
37. See infra Part II.A.
38. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895).
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available for trial. 39 The Court later criticized this approach as discretionary and without adequate protection for defendants’ confrontation rights and developed a categorical approach in which courts are
to classify statements as either testimonial or nontestimonial. 40 The
Court provided conflicting messages, however, on whether, when applying the categorical analysis, the declarant’s perspective controls,
thereby undermining the Court’s efforts to reduce inconsistency in
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. 41
1. The United States Supreme Court Initially Utilized Open-Ended
Tests to Determine Whether a Statement Was Reliable and
Therefore Admissible Under the Confrontation Clause
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.” 42 Three cases illustrate the evolution of the
Supreme Court’s early understanding of this language: Mattox v. United States, 43 Dutton v. Evans, 44 and Ohio v. Roberts. 45 In Mattox, the Court
explained the importance of the confrontation right, yet stated that,
under certain situations, this right should yield to considerations of
public policy. 46 The Mattox Court suggested that statements falling
within the hearsay exception of dying declarations may be admissible
in the absence of confrontation. 47 Then, in Dutton, the Court demonstrated how the right to confrontation may also be dispensed with
when statements bear sufficient “indicia of reliability.” 48 Finally, in
Roberts, the Court consolidated the reasoning of the above two cases
by articulating a reliability test for statement admissibility under the
Confrontation Clause. 49

39. See infra Part II.A.1. For a definition of hearsay rules, see note 56. For a description of when a witness is unavailable, see note 67.
40. See infra Part II.A.2.
41. See infra Part II.A.3.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment is made binding on the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
43. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
44. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
45. 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
46. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242–43.
47. Id. at 243–44.
48. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89.
49. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
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Mattox was the first case in which the Court highlighted the significance of the Confrontation Clause. 50 The Court explained that the
Confrontation Clause was intended to prevent the use of ex parte examinations of witnesses as evidence against the defendant and to protect the defendant’s opportunity for cross-examination. 51 The procedural guarantees provided by the Sixth Amendment ensure not only
that the defendant has the opportunity “of testing the recollection
and sifting the conscience of the witness,” but also that the witness is
“compell[ed] . . . to stand face to face with the jury in order that they
may . . . judge . . . whether he is worthy of belief.” 52
Despite the importance of the rights afforded by the Confrontation Clause, the Mattox Court acknowledged that public policy considerations might justify dispensing with these rights. 53 The Court
recognized that chief among these public policy considerations was
fairness. 54 The Court reasoned that there were situations where it
would not be just for a defendant to “go scot free” merely because a
witness was not available for trial. 55
Seeking to accommodate this public policy interest, the Mattox
Court implied that certain hearsay exceptions 56 were admissible under the Confrontation Clause. 57 For instance, in the Court’s view, the
admission of dying declarations aided in the administration of justice
by ensuring that a defendant did not avoid conviction simply because
a witness had died and could not provide testimony at trial. 58 Acknowledging that dying declarations are typically made outside the
50. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242–43 (“There is doubtless reason for saying that the accused
should never lose the benefit of any of [the] safeguards [provided by the Confrontation
Clause] . . . .”).
51. Id. at 242.
52. Id. at 242–43.
53. See id. at 243 (stating that the right to confrontation “must occasionally give way to
considerations of public policy”).
54. See id. at 243–44 (asserting that exceptions should be made to the constitutional
requirement of confrontation “to prevent a manifest failure of justice”).
55. Id. at 243.
56. Hearsay refers to “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”
FED R. EVID. 801(c). Generally, hearsay is not admissible at trial. FED. R. EVID. 802. However, as the Court has noted, hearsay law is “riddled with exceptions.” Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56, 62 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). See, e.g., FED.
R. EVID. 803(2) (stating that “excited utterances,” or “statement[s] relating to a startling
event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by
the event of condition,” are admissible despite the general ban against hearsay evidence).
57. See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243–44 (arguing that the admission of evidence under the
dying declarations hearsay exception comported with the Confrontation Clause).
58. Id. at 243.
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defendant’s presence and do not offer an opportunity for crossexamination, the Court nevertheless asserted that these statements
may be deemed truthful even without the scrutiny of confrontation. 59
The Court reasoned that a witness’s “impending death is presumed to
remove all temptation to falsehood, and to enforce as strict an adherence to the truth as would the obligation of an oath.” 60 Thus, in the
Court’s view, confrontation was unnecessary to ensure that a dying
witness provided honest statements, and the Court concluded that dying declarations may be admitted at trial. 61
Similarly, in Dutton v. Evans, the Court suggested that admitting
statements within the coconspirator hearsay exception 62 furthered the
administration of justice by ensuring the admission of truthful statements. 63 The Court explained that because the coconspirator’s
statements were made spontaneously and were against the coconspirator’s interests, they bore “indicia of reliability.” 64 Implying that confrontation was therefore unnecessary to ensure the witness’s honesty,
the Court concluded that the coconspirator’s statements were admissible at trial. 65
In Ohio v. Roberts, the Court consolidated the reasoning of Mattox
and Dutton by developing a reliability test for statement admissibility
under the Confrontation Clause. 66 The Roberts Court explained that
statements made by witnesses not present at trial are admissible under
two conditions: (1) when the witnesses are unavailable 67 and (2) when
the statements are reliable. 68 The Court further elaborated that a
59. Id. at 243–44.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. The coconspirator hearsay exception refers to out-of-court statements made by a
defendant’s fellow conspirator while “in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 81 (1970). In Dutton, the state evidentiary rule at issue
included within this exception statements made by the coconspirator during a period of
concealing the criminal activity. Id.
63. See id. at 89 (asserting that the coconspirator’s statements should be admitted because there was no reason to suspect that the coconspirator had lied).
64. Id. The defendant’s coconspirator was a man who, along with the defendant and
one other man, attacked and murdered three police officers. Id. at 76–77. The statements
at issue were made by the coconspirator to a fellow prisoner. Id. at 77.
65. See id. at 89 (stating that the objective of the Confrontation Clause is to guarantee
the truthfulness of witnesses’ statements and that this objective was accomplished in the
case at bar by the demonstration of certain “indicia of reliability”).
66. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
67. A witness is unavailable when, despite good faith efforts made by the prosecution,
the witness cannot be made to appear at trial. Id. at 74 (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S.
719, 724–25 (1968)).
68. Id. at 66.
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statement is reliable when it falls within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception,” such as dying declarations, or is supported by “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,” such as statements by a coconspirator. 69 The Court reasoned that its earlier cases reflect the view
that, so long as statements made by unavailable witnesses are reliable,
they need not be subject to confrontation. 70 The Court therefore developed an open-ended standard of Confrontation Clause analysis in
which courts are to determine statement reliability.
2. The United States Supreme Court Later Rejected the Reliability Test
and Developed a Categorical Standard of Confrontation Clause
Analysis
Twenty-five years after Roberts, in Crawford v. Washington, the
Court criticized the reliability test as “replacing categorical constitutional guarantees with open-ended balancing tests.” 71 In doing so, the
Crawford Court identified major issues related to the reliability test of
Roberts. First, the Court argued that basing statement admissibility on
hearsay rules led to abuse of defendants’ rights because, as the rules
of evidence change over time, so does the admissibility of statements
under the Confrontation Clause. 72 Second, the Court asserted that,
by allowing courts wide discretion to decide the reliability of evidence,
a defendant’s right to confrontation was vulnerable to judicial override. 73 In the Court’s belief, the “[v]ague standards” provided by the
reliability test were “manipulable” and left the enforcement of defendants’ confrontation rights to the whims of courts. 74
Seeking to address the issues of the reliability test, the Court developed a categorical approach by basing the admissibility of statements on whether they are testimonial or nontestimonial. 75 The
Court explained that testimonial statements made by a witness who
did not testify at trial are admissible under the Confrontation Clause
only when (1) the witness is unavailable for trial and (2) the defen-

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67–68. Justice Scalia wrote for the Court in this pioneering
decision. Id. at 38.
72. Id. at 50–51 (“Leaving the regulation of out-of-court statements to the law of evidence would render the Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent even the most flagrant
inquisitorial practices.”).
73. Id. at 67–68.
74. Id. at 68.
75. Id.
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dant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. 76 By contrast,
nontestimonial statements made by a witness who did not testify at trial are admissible when states allow this evidence under their hearsay
law. 77
The Court’s focus on whether statements are testimonial
stemmed from the text of the Confrontation Clause, which speaks of
78
“witnesses” against the accused. Witnesses, according to the Court,
are “those who ‘bear testimony.’” 79 Although it defined “testimony” as
“[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact,” the Court declined to provide a comprehensive definition of the term “testimonial.” 80 Instead, the Court
merely stated that, “at a minimum,” the term “testimonial” includes
“prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a
former trial[,] and [statements made during] police interrogations.” 81
Applying the new categorical approach, the Court concluded
that the witness’s statements in Crawford were inadmissible under the
Confrontation Clause. 82 The Court explained that the witness, Sylvia
Crawford, was read her Miranda warnings and then interrogated twice
by law enforcement about the involvement of her husband, Michael
Crawford, in a stabbing. 83 Furthermore, Sylvia was unavailable for trial because of the state marital privilege. 84 Based on these facts, the
Court determined that Sylvia’s statements were testimonial and that
Michael was denied an opportunity to cross-examine her. 85 Without
any additional discussion on what other kinds of situations produce
testimonial statements, the Court concluded that the admission of
Sylvia’s statements violated Michael’s right to confrontation. 86 Con76. Id.; cf. supra text accompanying notes 67–70 (describing the two-pronged reliability
test of Roberts).
77. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
78. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
79. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (quoting 2 N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).
80. Id. at 51, 68 (“We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of the term ‘testimonial.’”).
81. Id. at 68. The Court indicated that it “use[d] the term ‘interrogation’ in its colloquial, rather than any technical legal, sense.” Id. at 53 n.4.
82. Id. at 68.
83. Id. at 38. According to Michael, he and Sylvia went in search of the victim because
Michael was upset about an earlier incident in which the victim had attempted to rape Sylvia. Id. A fight ensued when Michael and Sylvia found the victim in his apartment, and
the victim was stabbed in the torso. Id.
84. Id. at 40. Generally, under the state marital privilege, a spouse is barred from testifying about the other spouse without that person’s consent. Id.
85. Id. at 68.
86. Id.
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sequently, the Crawford Court moved away from the open-ended reliability standard of Roberts, but did not provide a comprehensive definition of the term underlying its new categorical standard of Confrontation Clause analysis.
3. The United States Supreme Court Provided Further Guidance on
the Categorical Standard of Confrontation Clause Analysis but
Failed to Make Clear Whether It Was Crafting a DeclarantFocused Approach
The Court provided further direction on what statements are testimonial in Davis v. Washington, and thereby refined the categorical
approach developed in Crawford. 87 The Davis Court directed courts to
identify the primary purpose of a police interrogation in deciding
whether the declarant’s statements are testimonial or nontestimonial. 88 In applying the primary purpose analysis to the two cases analyzed in Davis, however, the Court did not make clear whether its
analysis focused on the declarant, the interrogator, or both. 89
In elaborating on the categorical standard established in Crawford, the Davis Court explained that statements made during police
interrogations are nontestimonial when the “circumstances objectively indicat[e] that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable
police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” 90 By contrast,
statements made during police interrogations are testimonial when
“the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” 91
The Court attempted to elucidate the primary purpose inquiry by
identifying the following factors as useful to the analysis: (1) whether
the declarant is describing events as they are happening; (2) whether
there is an ongoing emergency; (3) the nature of what is asked by law
enforcement and answered by the declarant; and (4) the interroga-

87. 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). The Court decided two separate cases in Davis: State v.
Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005) (en banc) and Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind.
2005). Davis, 547 U.S. at 817–21. The Davis Court’s opinion was written by Justice Scalia.
Id. at 817.
88. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
89. Compare id. at 823 n.1 (indicating a declarant-focused approach to the primary
purpose analysis), with id. at 827 (suggesting a combined focus on both the declarant and
the officers in determining the primary purpose of a police interrogation).
90. Id. at 822 (emphasis added).
91. Id. (emphasis added).
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tion’s level of formality. 92 This type of primary purpose analysis, the
Court indicated in dicta, should be conducted from the perspective of
the declarant, and not the perspective of law enforcement. 93 Later in
the opinion, however, the Court noted that in examining the nature
of the questions asked and answered, it considered the interrogators’
motives. 94
Still, applying the primary purpose analysis to the two consolidated cases in Davis, the Court suggested that both the declarant’s intent
and the interrogators’ motives are relevant considerations in determining statement admissibility under the Confrontation Clause. In
Davis itself, the Court decided that statements made during a 911 call
were nontestimonial. 95 The Court explained that the declarant, Michelle McCottry, made statements to a 911 emergency operator indicating that she was being assaulted by her former boyfriend, Adrian
Davis. 96 The Court applied the aforementioned factors and decided
that: (1) McCottry was describing events that were currently happening; (2) she was facing an ongoing emergency; (3) the nature of what
was asked and answered was necessary to respond to the ongoing
emergency; and (4) the interrogation was informal. 97 In applying the
third factor, the Court emphasized how the operator’s questions
aimed to resolve the ongoing emergency. 98 Consequently, despite
suggesting that the declarant’s intent should form the focus of its
analysis, the Court took the motives of law enforcement into account
when determining that the primary purpose of the police interrogation was to respond to an emergency and that the statements at issue
were nontestimonial. 99

92. Id. at 827.
93. See id. at 823 n.1 (“And of course even when interrogation exists, it is in the final
analysis the declarant’s statements, not the interrogator’s questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.”).
94. See id. at 827 (implying that questions asked by an interrogator may be considered
in deciding the primary purpose of an encounter).
95. Id. at 828–29.
96. Id. at 817. The Court stated that the actions of 911 emergency operators may be
considered actions by law enforcement for the purposes of Confrontation Clause analysis.
Id. at 823 n.2. Therefore, the Court labeled the conversation between McCottry and the
911 emergency operator an interrogation by law enforcement. Id. at 826.
97. Id. at 827.
98. Id. For example, the Court explained that the operator asked about who was attacking McCottry, so that the police would know whether they were pursuing a “violent
felon.” Id.
99. Id. at 827–28.
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Conversely, in Davis’s companion case, 100 the Court held that the
statements made when police responded to a domestic violence disturbance were testimonial. 101 The Court explained that when the police arrived, declarant Amy Hammon was sitting by herself on the
porch, and her husband, Hershel, was inside the house. 102 The police
kept Amy and Hershel apart while they questioned Amy about what
had happened. 103 Amy eventually told the police that Hershel had attacked her and her daughter. 104
The Court reasoned that the primary purpose of the police interrogation was to investigate a crime because: (1) Amy told the police
what had happened, as opposed to what was happening; (2) there was
no ongoing emergency; (3) the officer’s questions sought to investigate a past crime; and (4) the interrogation was formal. 105 The Court
focused again on the motives of law enforcement when it determined
that the officer questioned Amy “not seeking to determine . . . ‘what is
happening,’ but rather ‘what happened.’” 106 Relying once more on
both the declarant’s intent and the officers’ motives, the Court concluded that Amy’s statements were testimonial and inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause. 107 Taken together, the two consolidated cases in Davis indicate a focus on the declarant’s intent, but in fact
take into account the officers’ motives.
B. State and Lower Federal Courts Continue to Exercise Considerable
Discretion as They Decide Whose Perspective Controls the Categorical
Approach to Confrontation Clause Analysis
Following Crawford and Davis, state and lower federal courts are
to apply the categorical approach to Confrontation Clause analysis,
100. Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005).
101. Davis, 547 U.S. at 829–30.
102. Id. at 819.
103. Id. at 819–20.
104. Id. at 820. Amy filled out a “battery affidavit,” stating that Hershel “[b]roke our
[f]urnace &shoved me down on the floor into the broken glass. Hit me in the chest and
threw me down. Broke our lamps &phone. Tore up my van where I couldn’t leave the
house. Attacked my daughter.” Id.
105. Id. at 829–30.
106. Id. at 830.
107. Id. Although the Court appeared to draw a firm line when it stated that testimonial statements are inadmissible absent unavailability and a prior opportunity for crossexamination, it retained an exception to this rule. See id. at 833–34 (discussing the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing). In Giles v. California, the Court explained that the defendant forfeits the right to confrontation when she has engaged in wrongful acts aimed at
preventing a witness from testifying at trial. 554 U.S. 353, 359–60 (2008) (plurality opinion).

SilverFinalBookProof

2012]

3/14/2012 9:56 AM

MICHIGAN v. BRYANT

557

under which admissibility is based on whether statements are testimonial or nontestimonial. 108 Although the Court intended to reduce
open-ended analysis by developing this categorical approach, state
and lower federal courts continue to exercise considerable discretion
and reach divergent results as they decide how to classify statements. 109 Relying on incomplete and conflicting directives from the
Court in Crawford and Davis, state and lower federal courts alternate
between declarant-focused approaches 110 and approaches that consider both the declarant’s intent and the officers’ motives. 111
1. Declarant-Focused Approaches
Some state and lower federal courts apply a declarant-focused
approach in deciding whether statements are testimonial. 112 For example, in Raile v. People, 113 the Colorado Supreme Court explained
that, in deciding whether statements are admissible under the Confrontation Clause, courts must assume the perspective of a “reasonable declarant.” 114 In considering whether the declarant’s statements
to the police were admissible, 115 the court reasoned that, when the
declarant made her statements, there was no ongoing emergency because the declarant (1) was in police protection, (2) was not in danger, and (3) was not asking for help. 116 The court determined that
the declarant’s statements indicated a primary purpose of providing
information for a later criminal prosecution, were testimonial, and
their admission violated the defendant’s right to confrontation. 117

108. See supra text accompanying notes 75–77.
109. See, e.g., State v. Lucas, 407 Md. 307, 308–09, 965 A.2d 75, 76–77 (2009) (concluding that the victim’s statements to the police, made after the officers responded to a domestic disturbance and at the scene of the crime, were testimonial); State v. Shea, 965 A.2d
504, 505 (Vt. 2008) (facing similar facts as those encountered in Lucas, but deciding that
the declarant’s statements were nontestimonial).
110. See infra Part II.B.1.
111. See infra Part II.B.2.
112. See, e.g., United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 229 (2d Cir. 2004) (endorsing a declarant-focused approach); United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir. 2004)
(same); Cuyuch v. State, 667 S.E.2d 85, 89 (Ga. 2008) (same); State v. Camarena, 176 P.3d
380, 387 (Or. 2008) (en banc) (same).
113. 148 P.3d 126 (Colo. 2006) (en banc).
114. Id. at 133.
115. Id. at 128.
116. Id. at 133.
117. Id. Despite the court’s conclusion that the defendant’s right to confrontation was
violated, the court did not reverse the defendant’s conviction. Id. at 136. The court decided that the admission of the statements was harmless error because it had a negligible
impact on the defense. Id.
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Similarly, in United States v. Hinton, 118 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit suggested that the defendant’s reasonable expectations control whether his statements are testimonial. 119
The declarant in Hinton, Thomas Mack, first made statements to the
police in a 911 call and later in person when the police arrived at the
scene of the crime. 120 In the 911 call, Mack reported that an unknown individual had threatened him with a gun. 121 When the police
responded to the call, Mack rode with the officers in their cruiser and
eventually identified the defendant, Thomas Hinton, as his assailant. 122 Reasoning that Mack was seeking the help of the police in
ending a harrowing experience when he called 911, the court decided
that Mack’s statements were nontestimonial and admissible. 123 By
contrast, the court determined that, when Mack identified Hinton
while riding in the police cruiser, Mack was seeking to facilitate the
officers’ investigation of a crime. 124 His identification of Hinton was
accordingly categorized as inadmissible, testimonial evidence. 125
2. Combined Declarant- and Interrogator-Focused Approaches
A number of state and lower federal courts take both the declarant’s intent and the officers’ motives into account when classifying
statements as testimonial or nontestimonial. 126 For instance, in Wright
v. State, 127 the Indiana Court of Appeals considered both the declarant’s statements and the officers’ questions, and thereby deemed
both the declarant and the police relevant to Confrontation Clause
analysis. 128 When the police discovered the declarant, R.A., he was
bleeding profusely from multiple stab wounds. 129 In response to an
officer’s question of who had stabbed him, R.A. identified Sean

118. 423 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2005).
119. Id. at 360.
120. Id. at 356–57.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 357. From the police cruiser, Mack pointed to two individuals and stated,
“There you go.” Id.
123. Id. at 361–62.
124. Id. at 361.
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260, 270 (4th Cir. 2008) (considering
the perspectives of both the declarant and law enforcement); Belton v. Blaisdell, 559 F.
Supp. 2d 128, 157 (D.N.H. 2008) (same); State v. Scacchetti, 711 N.W.2d 508, 513 (Minn.
2008) (same); State v. Franklin, S.W.3d 799, 817–18 (Tenn. 2010) (same).
127. 916 N.E.2d 269 (Ind. App. 2009).
128. Id. at 276–77.
129. Id. at 272–73.
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Wright. 130 To decide whether R.A.’s identification of Wright was admissible under the Confrontation Clause, the court examined how
R.A.’s statements referenced his current injuries and suggested that
there was an ongoing emergency. 131 The court also evaluated the
purpose of the officers’ questions and determined that their inquiries
were necessary for resolving the emergency. 132 Based on both R.A.’s
intent and the officers’ motives, the court decided that Wright’s right
to confrontation was not violated by admitting R.A.’s statements because the statements were nontestimonial. 133
Likewise, in United States v. Arnold, 134 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered the perspectives of both the
declarant and the police in determining whether the declarant’s
statements to the officers were admissible. 135 The declarant, Tamica
Gordon, called 911 and stated that her mother’s boyfriend, Joseph
Arnold, had pointed a gun at her. 136 The police arrived on the scene
shortly thereafter, and Gordon, visibly upset, told them that Arnold
was trying to kill her. 137 Arnold subsequently returned to the scene
and, upon his arrival, Gordon identified him as the man who had
threatened her. 138 In examining whether each of Gordon’s statements was admissible, the court considered what Gordon and the officers knew during their encounter. 139 The court reasoned that neither Gordon nor the officers knew whether Arnold posed a continued
threat. 140 The court further determined that reasonable officers in
this situation would perceive an emergency because an armed person
was at large. 141 The court concluded that all of Gordon’s statements
were nontestimonial and that their admission did not violate Arnold’s
right to confrontation. 142
130. Id.
131. Id. at 276.
132. Id. at 276–77.
133. Id.
134. 486 F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 2007).
135. Id. at 190.
136. Id. at 179. In addition, Gordon stated that Arnold was a convicted murderer and
that he had recently been released from prison. Id.
137. Id. at 179–80. Gordon also described Arnold’s gun as a “black handgun.” Id. at
180.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 189–91.
140. Id. at 190.
141. Id. (“No reasonable officer could arrive at a scene while the victim was still ‘screaming’ and ‘crying’ about a recent threat to her life by an individual who had a gun and who
was likely still in the vicinity without perceiving that an emergency still existed.”).
142. Id. at 193.
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As these recent Confrontation Clause cases demonstrate, the Supreme Court sought to minimize discretionary evaluations of statements’ reliability by introducing a categorical approach in deciding
whether statements are testimonial or nontestimonial. The Court
failed, however, to give clear guidance on whether courts need to
consider the declarant’s intent, the officers’ motives, or both in making this determination. As a result, state and lower federal courts’ decisions regarding statement admissibility under the Confrontation
Clause continue to be unpredictable.
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Michigan v. Bryant, the United States Supreme Court vacated
the judgment of the Michigan Supreme Court, holding that the primary purpose of the police interrogation of Covington was to respond
to an ongoing emergency. 143 In so holding, the Court concluded that
Covington’s statements were nontestimonial and that their admission
did not violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 144
According to the majority, in order to determine whether Covington’s statements were testimonial and thus subject to the Confrontation Clause, the Court had to assess the primary purpose of the
interrogation by conducting an objective evaluation of the interrogation’s circumstances as well as the parties’ statements and actions. 145
This objective evaluation consisted of a number of factors, including
the existence of an ongoing emergency, 146 the type and scope of the
emergency, 147 the victim’s medical condition, 148 and the level of for-

143. 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1166–67 (2011).
144. Id. at 1167.
145. Id. at 1156. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 1149. According to the Court, the circumstances of an interrogation are “matters of objective fact.”
Id. at 1156. To objectively evaluate the parties’ statements and actions, a court must determine the purpose that reasonable individuals would have had in that particular encounter. Id.
146. Id. at 1157. The Court reasoned that the existence of an ongoing emergency “focus[es] an individual’s attention on responding to the emergency,” thereby limiting the
possibility that the individual is fabricating statements and eliminating the need to subject
statements made during the emergency to cross-examination. Id.
147. Id. at 1158. The Court explained that the type and scope of an emergency may
depend on what kind of weapon is involved. Id. For example, when the weapon involved
is a gun, the emergency may not end when the victim escapes from his assailant because
the general public continues to face a threat. Id. at 1158–59.
148. Id. at 1159. The Court stated that the victim’s medical condition is important to
the primary purpose analysis because “it sheds light on the ability of the victim to have any
purpose at all in responding to police questions and on the likelihood that any purpose
formed would necessarily be a testimonial one.” Id.
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mality of the situation. 149 The Court also explained that, in examining the statements and actions of the parties, both the declarant’s
statements and the interrogators’ questions should be considered. 150
In deciding the case, the Court first examined the circumstances
of the police interrogation of Covington. 151 When the police responded to the radio dispatch, they lacked important information, including who the victim and his attacker were and whether the attacker
posed a continued threat to the victim or public. 152 In addition, Covington’s interrogation did not reveal the shooter’s current location,
whether the shooting reflected a private dispute, or whether the danger had ended. 153 In the Court’s opinion, the threat did not end
when Covington fled Bryant’s house because the case involved a
gun. 154 Based on the above circumstances, the Court concluded that
there was an ongoing emergency because an armed shooter was at
large, and it was unclear whether the shooter would attack again and,
if so, who was at risk. 155
Next, the Court examined Covington’s and the officers’ statements and actions to determine whether the primary purpose of the
police interrogation was to respond to the ongoing emergency. 156
Noting that Covington was in pain and that he repeatedly asked the
police when emergency medical services would arrive, the Court concluded that a reasonable person in Covington’s situation would not
have had a primary purpose to provide testimony necessary for a later
criminal prosecution. 157 In turn, in examining the statements and actions of the police, the Court focused on the officers’ questions,
149. Id. at 1160. The Court explained that, when an interrogation is formal, the implication is that there is no ongoing emergency. Id. However, the fact that an interrogation
is informal does not necessarily imply that there is an ongoing emergency. Id.
150. Id. The Court referred to its focus on both the declarant and the interrogator as a
“combined approach.” Id. at 1161. The Court rejected the argument that Davis v. Washington demands a declarant-focused approach, stating that “[t]he language in the footnote
[in Davis] was not meant to determine how the courts are to assess the nature of the declarant’s purpose, but merely to remind readers that it is the statements, and not the questions, that must be evaluated under the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 1160–61 n.11. In addition, the Court believed that a combined approach would resolve the ambiguities that
arise from only considering one party’s perspective. Id. at 1161.
151. Id. at 1163.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1163–64.
154. Id. at 1164.
155. Id. The Court stated that the emergency did not continue until Bryant was arrested a year later, but declined to identify exactly when the emergency terminated. Id. at
1164–65.
156. Id. at 1165–66.
157. Id. at 1165.
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which assessed the nature of the threat. 158 Given the evaluative nature
of the questions, the Court determined that the police sought the information necessary for the ongoing emergency response. 159
Finally, the Court considered the informality of Covington’s interrogation, which was conducted in a public place and concluded
with the arrival of emergency medical services. 160 The Court reasoned
that the informal nature of the interrogation implied that its primary
purpose was to cope with the ongoing emergency. 161 Based on an examination of the interrogation’s circumstances as well as the parties’
statements and actions, the Court concluded that Covington’s statements to the police were nontestimonial and that the admission of
these statements did not violate Bryant’s right to confrontation. 162
In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas agreed that the admission of Covington’s statements to the police did not violate the Confrontation Clause, yet he criticized the majority’s primary purpose
analysis. 163 Justice Thomas argued that the primary purpose analysis
creates uncertainty for law enforcement and lower courts and results
in unpredictable decisions. 164 He contended that the better approach
would be to analyze the extent to which an interrogation resembles
practices that the Confrontation Clause historically sought to eliminate. 165 Consequently, because the police interrogation of Covington
was highly informal, Justice Thomas found that the interrogation did
not represent the kind of practice that the Confrontation Clause historically addressed, and Covington’s statements were admissible at trial. 166
In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that Covington’s statements were
testimonial and that the majority distorted Confrontation Clause jurisprudence by deciding otherwise. 167 First, he criticized the majority’s
focus on the declarant’s intent and the interrogators’ motives and as158. Id. at 1165–66. The Court insisted that it did not attach “controlling weight” to the
officers’ motives in an interrogation. Id. at 1162. Instead, “the declarant’s statements, not
the interrogator’s questions . . . must . . . pass the Sixth Amendment test.” Id. The Court
asserted, however, that in deciding whether statements are testimonial, “courts should look
to all of the relevant circumstances,” and the interrogator constitutes such a relevant consideration. Id.
159. Id. at 1166.
160. Id. at 1160, 1166.
161. Id. at 1166.
162. Id. at 1166–67.
163. Id. at 1167 (Thomas, J., concurring).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1167–68.
167. Id. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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serted that the declarant’s intent is what matters. 168 Examining the
interrogation from Covington’s perspective, Justice Scalia concluded
that Covington knew there was no ongoing threat from his attacker
and that he intended to provide the police with statements necessary
for Bryant’s eventual prosecution. 169
Second, Justice Scalia claimed the majority erred by concluding
that there was an ongoing emergency when the police questioned Covington. 170 In Justice Scalia’s view, because most murders involve only
one victim, it was unlikely that Covington’s attacker posed a continued threat to the police or public. 171 Finally, Justice Scalia argued
that the majority returned to discredited standards of Confrontation
Clause analysis by requiring judges to conduct open-ended evaluations of the totality of the circumstances and to consider the reliability
of a declarant’s statements to determine their admissibility at trial. 172
Justice Ginsburg also dissented, arguing that Covington’s statements to the police were testimonial. 173 Agreeing with Justice Scalia,
Justice Ginsburg asserted that the declarant’s intent should govern
the analysis, and not the interrogators’ motives. 174 In addition, Justice
Ginsburg briefly noted that, if the issue had been presented in this
case, she would have addressed the question of whether dying declarations are subject to the Confrontation Clause. 175

168. Id. at 1168–69. In Justice Scalia’s view, for a statement to be deemed testimonial,
“the declarant must intend the statement to be a solemn declaration rather than an unconsidered or offhand remark; and he must make the statement with the understanding
that it may be used to invoke the coercive machinery of the State against the accused.” Id.
The interrogators’ motives do not indicate how the declarant thought his words would be
used. Id. at 1169.
169. Id. at 1170. Justice Scalia also contended that, even considering the officers’ motives, “this is an absurdly easy case.” Id. at 1171. The Justice explained that the officers’
actions at the gas station indicated that they did not perceive a threat from Covington’s
attacker: they neither drew their weapons nor searched the premises for the shooter. Id.
170. Id. at 1172.
171. Id. at 1172–73.
172. Id. at 1175. Justice Scalia noted that “[t]he only virtue of the Court’s approach (if
it can be misnamed a virtue) is that it leaves judges free to reach the ‘fairest’ result under
the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 1170. Justice Scalia criticized this outcome, arguing that, under the majority’s approach, a defendant’s right to confrontation is vulnerable to being ignored. Id.
173. Id. at 1176 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
174. Id. Justice Ginsburg further agreed with Justice Scalia that the majority’s decision
created confusion in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. Id. at 1176–77.
175. Id. at 1177.
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IV. ANALYSIS
In Michigan v. Bryant, the United States Supreme Court held that
the primary purpose of the police interrogation of Covington was to
respond to an ongoing emergency. 176 Based on this determination,
the Court concluded that Covington’s statements were nontestimonial and that their admission did not violate Bryant’s right to confrontation. 177 The Court’s combined focus on the declarant’s intent and the
officers’ motives was a likely result of the incomplete and contradictory directives of Crawford and Davis. 178 The Court erred by focusing on
both the declarant and the police because this standard promotes a
discretionary analysis that leaves defendants’ rights to confrontation
insufficiently protected. 179 Instead of examining both the declarant’s
intent and the officers’ motives, the Court should have developed a
declarant-focused approach, and thereby secured defendants’ rights
to confront the witnesses against them. 180
A. The Bryant Court’s Combined Focus Was a Likely Result of the
Incomplete and Contradictory Directives of Crawford and Davis
The Court’s combined focus on the declarant’s intent and the officers’ motives was a predictable result of the incomplete and contradictory directives given in Crawford and Davis. As the Court laid down
a new standard of Confrontation Clause analysis in Crawford, it mistakenly failed to provide an adequately thorough definition of its key
term, “testimonial.” 181 Just two years later, in Davis, the Court offered
additional guidance on defining “testimonial,” yet still left ambiguity
in the application of the categorical standard. 182 The Bryant Court,
forced to maneuver the gaps and ambiguities established by Crawford
and Davis, responded with a combined focus on the declarant and the

176. Id. at 1166–67 (majority opinion).
177. Id. at 1167.
178. See infra Part.IV.A.
179. See infra Part IV.B.
180. See infra Part IV.C.
181. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (declining to define the term
“testimonial”).
182. Compare Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (explaining that whether
statements are testimonial depends on the primary purpose of the police-citizen encounter without indicating whose perspective should dictate the primary purpose of the interrogation), with id. at 823 n.1 (stating that “it is in the final analysis the declarant’s statements, not the interrogator’s questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to
evaluate”).
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officers that reasonably followed from precedent 183 but was unforeseen by Justice Scalia, 184 the author of those earlier opinions. 185
The Bryant Court applied a categorical standard that lacked a
clear definition of the term “testimonial.” Although legal scholars
considered Crawford a major shift in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, 186 the Court’s refusal to provide a comprehensive definition of
“testimonial” resulted in uncertainty. 187 Equipped only with the few
core examples of testimonial statements identified in Crawford, 188 state
and lower federal courts confronted situations that did not fit into any
of Crawford’s limited practices. 189 As a result, many courts reached divergent conclusions as they grappled with these unusual situations. 190
The Court’s failure to provide a more complete definition of
“testimonial” not only led to confusion among other courts, but also
opened the door for a later Court to significantly alter how the term
would be understood. 191 Indeed, in an effort to offer additional guidance on defining “testimonial,” the Court in Davis developed an en-

183. See id. at 827 (suggesting that both the declarant’s intent and the interrogators’
motives are relevant considerations in determining the primary purpose of an interrogation); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (declining to define the term “testimonial,” and thereby
leaving ambiguity in Confrontation Clause analysis).
184. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1174 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[The
Court’s decision in Bryant] is a gross distortion of the law . . . .”).
185. Davis, 547 U.S. at 817; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38.
186. See, e.g., Paul W. Grimm, Jerome E. Deise & John R. Grimm, The Confrontation
Clause and the Hearsay Rule: What Hearsay Exceptions Are Testimonial?, 40 U. BALT. L.F. 155,
157 (2010) (explaining that “Crawford shifted the touchstone of admissibility from a statement’s reliability to its testimonial nature”); Fred O. Smith, Jr., Note, Crawford’s Aftershock:
Aligning the Regulation of Nontestimonial Hearsay with the History and Purposes of the Confrontation Clause, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1497, 1498 (2008) (“Courts have called the decision a ‘bombshell,’ a ‘renaissance,’ and the dawning of a ‘new day’ in the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.”).
187. See, e.g., United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 228 (2d Cir. 2004) (describing how,
because the Crawford Court did not provide a comprehensive definition of “testimonial,” it
is unclear what are the “determinative” characteristics of testimonial statements).
188. The Crawford Court stated that, “at a minimum,” testimonial evidence includes
“prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial[,] and
[statements made during] police interrogations.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
189. See, e.g., Saget, 377 F.3d at 228–29 (finding that a declarant’s statements to an informant, whose identity is unknown to the declarant, are testimonial under Crawford even
though these circumstances were not identified in that case). But see United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 362 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that some of the statements at issue were
nontestimonial because they did not fit into any of the categories articulated by Crawford).
190. See supra Part II.B.
191. At oral argument in Bryant, Justice Breyer, who joined the Court’s opinion in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 37, admitted that he “did not foresee the scope of Crawford.” Transcript of
Oral Argument at 54, Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011) (No. 09-150), 2010 WL
3907894.
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tirely new test to categorize statements made in response to a police
interrogation. 192 The Davis Court explained that the primary purpose
of a police interrogation may dictate whether statements are testimonial. 193 While the primary purpose test was a helpful expansion of
the Crawford Court’s minimal construction of “testimonial” and fit easily into the categorical framework, it demonstrated the openendedness of the categorical standard and its ability to be easily manipulated. 194
Additionally, the Davis Court did little to rectify the ambiguity of
the categorical standard established in Crawford. In elaborating on
the categorical standard, the Davis Court provided conflicting instructions on the perspective from which the primary purpose test should
be conducted. In footnote 1 of Davis, the Court indicated that the
declarant’s intent—and not the interrogators’ motives—is what matters when determining the primary purpose of an interrogation and,
accordingly, statement admissibility under the Confrontation
Clause. 195 While identifying factors to elucidate the primary purpose
test, however, the Court opened up the analysis to the kinds of questions asked by law enforcement. 196 By incorporating law enforcement’s questions into the primary purpose test, the Bryant Court suggested that the interrogators’ motives are relevant considerations, 197
and undermined its previous suggestion that the declarant’s intent is
what matters.

192. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (determining that statements
“are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no . . . ongoing
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution”).
193. Id. For a detailed discussion of Davis’s primary purpose test, see supra text accompanying notes 87–91.
194. See Michael D. Cicchini, Judicial (In)Discretion: How Courts Circumvent the Confrontation Clause Under Crawford and Davis, 75 TENN. L. REV. 753, 765, (2008) (describing Davis
as providing a “potentially workable framework,” despite eventually concluding that it has
not lived up to this potential); id. at 778 (arguing that Crawford and Davis created a broad
and easily manipulated test for statement admissibility under the Confrontation Clause);
Grimm et al., supra note 186, at 158 (“Davis developed Crawford’s inchoate definition of
‘testimonial’ . . . .”).
195. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 823 n.1 (“[I]t is in the final analysis the declarant’s statements, not the interrogator’s questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.”).
196. See id. at 827 (examining the nature of the interrogators’ questions).
197. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1160–61 (2011) (suggesting that, because
Davis mandates the examination of the nature of interrogators’ questions, Davis requires
consideration of the interrogators’ primary purpose).
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The Bryant Court, acknowledging that Davis provided confusing
directives on whose perspective controls the categorical analysis, 198 determined that both the declarant’s intent and the interrogators’ motives are pertinent in determining the primary purpose of an interrogation. 199 Although Justice Scalia disparaged the majority’s combined
approach as unsupported by precedent, 200 the Bryant Court drew on
the Davis Court’s conflicting directives as evidence that both the declarant and the interrogators must be taken into account when deciding statement admissibility. 201 Specifically, the Bryant Court focused
on Davis’s examination of both the declarant’s statements and the interrogators’ questions and reasoned that Davis requires such a combined approach. 202 Having made this determination, the Bryant Court
then denied that footnote one of Davis mandates an exclusively declarant-focused approach. 203 In other words, the Bryant Court relied on
what the Davis Court did, as opposed to what the Davis Court said, in
concluding that a court must conduct a combined inquiry. Justice
Scalia therefore overlooked how Davis, an opinion that followed from

198. See id. at 1160 n.11 (“Some portions of Davis . . . have caused confusion about
whether the inquiry [into whether a statement is testimonial] prescribes examination of
one participant to the exclusion of the other.”). Commentators have come to different
conclusions about Davis’s instructions for whose perspective should control the primary
purpose analysis. See, e.g., Ellen Liang Yee, Confronting the “Ongoing Emergency”: A Pragmatic
Approach to Hearsay Evidence in the Context of the Sixth Amendment, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 729,
787 (2008) (explaining Davis’s “objective analysis” of the encounter’s primary purpose
“from the perspective of a reasonable third party who is unrelated to the incident”); Andrew Dylan, Note, Working Through the Confrontation Clause After Davis v. Washington, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 1905, 1937 (2007) (stating that, after Davis, “lower courts should feel
free” to consider the perspectives of both the declarant and the police); Thomas M. Forsyth, III, Note, Just Don’t Say You Heard It from Me: Bridging the Davis v. Washington Divide of
Indistinguishable Primary-Purpose Statements, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 263, 275 (2008) (asserting that “[t]he Davis text itself” supports a declarant-focused approach).
199. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160 (“Davis requires a combined inquiry that accounts for
both the declarant and the interrogator.”).
200. See id. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that Bryant “distorts our Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence”).
201. See id. at 1160 (majority opinion) (reasoning that both the declarant and his interrogators are relevant considerations in the primary purpose analysis based on the Davis
Court’s instruction to consider the nature of the declarant’s statements and the interrogators’ questions).
202. Id.
203. See id. at 1160–61 n.11 (“The language in the footnote was not meant to determine
how the courts are to assess the nature of the declarant’s purpose, but merely to remind
readers that it is the statements, and not the questions, that must be evaluated under the
Sixth Amendment.”).
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the open-ended analysis established in Crawford, contributed to the
Bryant Court’s decision to use a combined focus. 204
B. The Bryant Court Erred by Examining the Intent of the Declarant and
the Motives of the Police Because This Standard Establishes a
Discretionary Analysis That Provides Insufficient Protection of
Defendants’ Rights to Confrontation
The Court erred by considering both the declarant’s intent and
the officers’ motives because this approach facilitates a discretionary
standard and thereby offers minimal protection of defendants’ rights
to confront the witnesses against them. Although the Court stated
that it relied on a “combined inquiry,” 205 the Court was unclear
whether, depending on the circumstances, one perspective may be
weighed more heavily than another. 206 By allowing the categorical
analysis to emphasize the perspective of the declarant, the police, or
both, the Court ensured a return to a discretionary Confrontation
Clause analysis akin to that of the reliability standard under Ohio v.
Roberts. 207 Similar to the Roberts reliability test, the discretionary standard established by Bryant creates an unstable framework in which
state and lower federal courts may reach virtually any conclusion depending on which perspective they choose to focus. 208

204. See id. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Court’s current decision,
and not any earlier approach to Confrontation Clause analysis, has muddied the law). Justice Scalia’s astonishment over the Bryant Court’s combined approach is especially surprising given that a number of state and lower federal courts had already come to similar conclusions about how to conduct the primary purpose analysis and, accordingly, categorize
statements as either testimonial or nontestimonial. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 486
F.3d 117, 190 (6th Cir. 2007) (utilizing a combined inquiry in classifying the declarant’s
statements); State v. Franklin, 308 S.W.3d 799, 817–18 (Tenn. 2010) (same). But see United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 360 (3d Cir. 2005) (employing a declarant-focused approach); Cuyuch v. State, 667 S.E.2d 85, 89 (Ga. 2008) (same).
205. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160, 1166–67 (majority opinion).
206. See id. at 1158 (explaining that the determination of whether an emergency exists,
for the purpose of categorizing statements as either testimonial or nontestimonial, is a
“highly context-dependent inquiry”).
207. 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); see also
supra text accompanying notes 66–70 (discussing the Roberts test). The Crawford Court explained that “[t]he framework [under Roberts] is so unpredictable that it fails to provide
meaningful protection from even core confrontation violations.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62–
63.
208. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1170 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The only virtue of the Court’s
approach (if it can be misnamed a virtue) is that it leaves judges free to reach the ‘fairest’
result under the totality of the circumstances. If the dastardly police trick a declarant into
giving an incriminating statement against a sympathetic defendant, a court can focus on
the police’s intent and declare the statement testimonial. If the defendant ‘deserves’ to go
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A critical flaw of the Bryant decision is that the Court did not
make clear whether, depending on the circumstances, the declarant’s
intent may be emphasized over police motives or vice versa. Despite
the fact that after Davis many state and lower federal courts were already applying the primary purpose test inconsistently by emphasizing
one perspective over another, 209 Bryant has left the right to confrontation in an even more precarious position than it occupied under Davis. Whereas before Bryant a combined focus might have been implied from Davis’s confusing directives, now it is mandated by the
terms of Bryant. 210
The Bryant Court expressly stated that Confrontation Clause
analysis is “highly context-dependent” 211 and that “courts should look
to all of the relevant circumstances” in determining whether a declarant’s statements are testimonial. 212 Thus, Bryant freed state and lower federal courts to consider anything “relevant” in deciding whether
statements are admissible at trial. 213 Under the guise of “relevance,”
state and lower federal courts may use their discretion to focus the
analysis on factors emphasizing the perspective of the declarant, law
enforcement, or both. 214
In allowing courts to continue making discretionary decisions of
which perspective matters, the Court guaranteed a return to the unpredictability that characterized the Roberts era. 215 The declarant and
the officers often have very different perspectives in a police interrogation. 216 As Justice Scalia recognized in Bryant, the perspective from
which an interrogation is analyzed has a significant impact on wheth-

to jail, then a court can focus on whatever perspective is necessary to declare damning
hearsay nontestimonial.”).
209. See, e.g., Arnold, 486 F.3d at 190 (utilizing a combined approach, but emphasizing
the officers’ motives by examining what the officers knew at various points throughout the
police interrogation).
210. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160 (majority opinion) (“Davis requires a combined inquiry
that accounts for both the declarant and the interrogator.” (emphasis added)).
211. Id. at 1158.
212. Id. at 1162.
213. Id.; see also supra note 208.
214. See, e.g., Cuyuch v. State, 667 S.E.2d 85, 89 (Ga. 2008) (using a declarant-focused
approach). But see United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260, 270 (4th Cir. 2008) (using a
combined approach).
215. For a discussion of the flaws of Roberts, see supra Part II.A.2.
216. See, e.g., United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 228–29 (2d Cir. 2004) (suggesting
that, although the police may have had a primary purpose to investigate a crime, the declarant did not have the same purpose); Raile v. People, 148 P.3d 126, 133 (Colo. 2006) (en
banc) (acknowledging that the police officer might have perceived an ongoing emergency, but that, from the perspective of the declarant, there was none).
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er the declarant’s statements during that interrogation are deemed
testimonial or nontestimonial. 217
By facilitating discretionary determinations of which perspective
is controlling, the Court created a standard whereby state and lower
federal courts can obtain virtually any result from a set of facts. This
discretionary and unpredictable approach to Confrontation Clause
analysis, as Justice Scalia recognized, leaves defendants’ rights vulnerable to judicial override. 218 Upon a determination that statements are
nontestimonial, state and lower federal courts may deprive defendants of the opportunity for cross-examination, 219 which is a critical
tool for examining testimony and exposing its faults. 220 In the absence of cross-examination, defendants may be prosecuted or convicted on the basis of evidence that is neither truthful nor accurate. 221
Instead of elevating defendants’ confrontation rights from the vulnerable position they held after Davis, the Bryant Court relegated
these rights to the discretion of state and lower federal courts, rendering these rights as easily ignored as they were under the reliability
standard of Roberts. 222

217. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1170 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of “Testimonial,” 71 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 255 (2005) (implying that
the perspective from which an interrogation is considered has an effect on the outcome of
the analysis).
218. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1170 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
219. Cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) (“The Roberts test allows a jury
to hear evidence, untested by the adversary process, based on a mere judicial determination of reliability. It thus replaces the constitutionally prescribed method of assessing reliability with a wholly foreign one.”).
220. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895) (explaining that, when the
defendant cross-examines a witness, he “has an opportunity not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling [the witness] to stand
face to face with the jury in order that they may . . . judge . . . whether he is worthy of belief”); see also Scott G. Stewart, Note, The Right of Confrontation, Ongoing Emergencies, and the
Violent-Perpetrator-at-Large Problem, 61 STAN. L. REV. 751, 762 (2008) (explaining that crossexamination has been described by legal scholars as essential for determining the truthfulness of witnesses’ testimony).
221. See John R. Grimm, Note, A Wavering Bright Line: How Crawford v. Washington Denies Defendants a Consistent Confrontation Right, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 185, 209–10 (2011)
(highlighting the importance of the truth-seeking function of cross-examination for both
testimonial and nontestimonial statements); Smith, supra note 186, at 1518–19 (explaining
how cross-examination allows the defendant to test the witness’s memory and perception
as well as her credibility); see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 (“Dispensing with confrontation
because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.”).
222. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63–64 (explaining that courts under Roberts decided the
reliability of statements through subjective determinations of what factors are most important and that this discretionary standard led to abuse of defendants’ confrontation rights).
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C. Rather than Rely on a Combined Focus, the Bryant Court Should
Have Created a Declarant-Focused Approach That More Consistently
Safeguards Defendants’ Rights to Confront Witnesses
Instead of employing a combined focus on both the declarant’s
intent and the officers’ motives, the Court should have created a declarant-focused approach that is better equipped to safeguard defendants’ confrontation rights. By stipulating what perspective state and
lower federal courts should assume in determining whether a declarant’s statements are testimonial, the Court would have eliminated
much of the discretionary analysis that goes into determining whose
perspective controls. 223 The Court also would have reduced the unpredictability caused by attempting to identify the motives of law enforcement. 224 In reducing discretionary decisions and making the
analysis more consistent, the Court would have more adequately protected defendants’ confrontation rights from judicial override and
thereby ensured defendants’ opportunity for cross-examination. 225
If the Court had directed state and lower federal courts to use a
declarant-focused approach, it would have prevented discretionary
decisions of which perspective determines whether a declarant’s
statements are testimonial. Limited to the intent of the declarant,
courts would be unable to choose the perspective that yields the desired outcome. 226 By preventing courts from reaching any conclusion
on a given set of facts, the Court would have guaranteed that defendants’ confrontation rights are not overridden at courts’ whims and
that defendants are not improperly denied the opportunity for crossexamination of witnesses.
In providing state and lower federal courts with a declarantfocused approach, the Court also would have simplified the categorical standard by reducing the uncertainty caused by determining the
primary purpose of the police. When the police respond to an emergency, they nearly always have dual motives of investigating a crime
and responding to an urgent situation. 227 Justice Thomas noted that
223. See supra text accompanying notes 215–217.
224. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 839 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part) (referring to the process of discerning the primary motive
of the police as “an exercise in fiction”).
225. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1176 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that open-ended tests in which judges make subjective determinations of statement
admissibility do not adequately protect defendants’ confrontation rights).
226. See id. at 1170 (explaining that, under the majority’s approach, courts can choose
the perspective they wish to focus on, and thereby obtain the preferred outcome).
227. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 839 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“In many, if not most, cases where police respond to a report of a crime,
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assigning one of these motives primacy “requires constructing a hierarchy of purpose that will rarely be present—and is not reliably discernible.” 228 By eliminating the perspective of the police as a consideration, the Court would have protected defendants’ rights to
confrontation—and therefore their opportunities for crossexamination—from inconsistent judgments of officers’ motives.
An example of the combined approach in application will demonstrate its decreased ability to protect defendants’ confrontation
rights, as compared with the proposed declarant-focused inquiry. In
Wright v. State, the Indiana Court of Appeals used a combined approach to conclude that the declarant’s statements were nontestimonial and that their admission did not run afoul of the Confrontation Clause. 229 The court examined the officers’ perspective, focusing
on how the officers were awaiting the homicide unit when they interrogated the declarant and that they did not know whether the defendant posed a continued danger. 230 By contrast, the court’s consideration of the declarant’s perspective was limited to the observation of
the “immediacy of [his] injuries.” 231
Based on the facts of Wright, the court could have just as easily
implemented its combined inquiry to reach an entirely different conclusion. Having received a phone call from the declarant’s neighbor
that someone was outside her front door calling for help, the police
were on scene to investigate a potential crime. 232 The police behavior
on the scene did not indicate that the officers feared the declarant’s
attacker would return. 233 The police did not search the area for the
assailant, but rather proceeded to question the declarant. 234 From the
declarant’s perspective, he had fled his attacker and was now in police
protection. 235 Taken together, the above considerations suggest—
counter to the court’s decision—that there was no ongoing emergenwhether pursuant to a 911 call from the victim or otherwise, the purposes of an interrogation, viewed from the perspective of the police, are both to respond to the emergency situation and to gather evidence.” (citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984))).
228. Id. But see Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1161 (majority opinion) (stating that “[t]he combined approach . . . ameliorates problems that could arise from looking solely to one participant”).
229. 916 N.E.2d 269, 276–77 (Ind. App. 2009); see also Part II.B.2.
230. Wright, 916 N.E.2d at 276–77.
231. Id. at 276.
232. Id. at 272.
233. Id. at 272–73.
234. Id.; cf. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1171–72 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(stating that there was no ongoing emergency where the officers all questioned the declarant before conducting a search of the gas station).
235. Wright, 916 N.E.2d at 272–73.
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cy and that the police aimed to obtain information for a later criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, the court could have reasonably determined that the declarant’s statements were inadmissible, testimonial
evidence.
Restricting analysis of Wright to the intent of the declarant leads
to a clearer answer about whether the declarant’s statements may be
admitted. Having escaped his attacker and found refuge in police
protection, the declarant referenced past events in telling law enforcement how he sustained his injuries. 236 Viewed objectively, the
declarant did not provide information to the police to end an attack
and resolve an ongoing emergency. 237 Based on this conclusion, the
declarant’s statements were testimonial and should not have been
admitted, absent a prior opportunity for cross-examination by the defendant. Consequently, the declarant-focused approach prevents the
admission of statements that a combined approach allows into evidence, thereby demonstrating the added protection that the former
standard offers defendants.
The additional safeguards of the declarant-focused approach may
provide the difference between acquittal and conviction. 238 The exercise of the confrontation right, as explained earlier, ensures an opportunity for cross-examination. 239 Cross-examination, in turn, allows
the defendant to expose critical flaws in the evidence against him. 240
By revealing gaps and inconsistencies in the evidence, the defendant
may introduce a reasonable doubt of his guilt and defeat the case
against him. 241 The right to confrontation affords the defendant a
236. Id. Contra Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 827 (2006) (explaining that the declarant faced imminent danger when describing domestic abuse simultaneously with its occurrence).
237. Although the declarant was certainly suffering from serious injuries, the declarant’s
statements did not provide the information necessary for the police to assess the nature of
his wounds or provide first aid. The declarant’s statement that “Sean” had stabbed him in
no way aided the administration of medical care but instead provided essential information for a criminal investigation. Wright, 916 N.E.2d at 273. For additional facts of Wright,
see Part II.B.2.
238. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) (suggesting that, in barring
statements under the Confrontation Clause, the defendant may avoid conviction).
239. See supra text accompanying notes 219–221.
240. See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242–43 (explaining the truth-seeking function of crossexamination); see also Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV. 475,
501 (2006) (highlighting the potential of cross-examination to test the evidence against
the accused and to uncover the truth).
241. See, e.g., Josephine Ross, What’s Reliability Got to Do with the Confrontation Clause After
Crawford?, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 383, 396–97 (2009) (providing an example where crossexamination might have uncovered flaws in a witness’s testimony and resulted in the jury
doubting the reliability of his statements).
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chance to uncover the weaknesses of the prosecution’s case, and merits the increased safeguards provided by the declarant-focused approach, as compared with the inadequate protection offered by the
Bryant Court’s combined focus on the declarant and his interrogators.
V. CONCLUSION
In Michigan v. Bryant, the Court determined that Covington’s
statements to the police were nontestimonial and beyond the scope of
the Confrontation Clause because they were obtained through an interrogation aimed at resolving an ongoing emergency. 242 The Court’s
combined focus on both the declarant and the interrogators to categorize Covington’s statements as nontestimonial followed from the
Court’s incomplete and contradictory directives in Crawford and Davis. 243 The Court therefore backed itself into a combined inquiry that
enables state and lower federal courts to obtain virtually any result on
a given set of facts and fails to adequately guarantee defendants’ confrontation rights. 244 Rather than rely upon a combined focus on the
declarant and the officers, the Court should have developed a declarant-focused approach that restricts discretionary analysis and protects
defendants’ rights to confront the witnesses against them. 245

242.
243.
244.
245.

Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1166–67 (2011) (majority opinion).
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.C.

